Michigan Law Review
Volume 49

Issue 8

1951

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION BY ADMISSION, OR
KNOWLEDGE, OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES
Morris G. Shanker
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Morris G. Shanker, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION BY ADMISSION, OR KNOWLEDGE, OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES, 49 MICH. L. REV. 1228
(1951).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol49/iss8/14

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1228

MrcmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 49

OoNSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-PBIVILEGB AGAINST SBLFlliCRIMINATION BY ADMISSION, OR KNowL:EDGB, OF CoMMUNIST AcrivITIBs--

ln response to a subpoena, petitioner appeared as a witness before a United
States district court grand jury. Several questions concerning· her knowledge
and association with the Communist Party were put to her. In each case, she
refused to answer the questions, claiming the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination.1 For refusal to answer these same questions when brought
before the district court, petitioner was adjudged to be in contempt of court.
The court of appeals affirmed the holdings,2 and certiorari was granted by the
Supreme Court.3 Held, judgment reversed. The Smith Act makes it unlawful
to advocate knowingly the desirability of the overthrow of the government by
force or violence, to organize or help to organize any society which teaches, advocates, or encourages such overthrow of the government, or to be or become a
member of such a group with knowledge of its purposes.4 In view of that act,
answers to the questions propounded might have furnished a link in the chain
of evidence needed in a prosecution of the petitioner for violation of, or conspiracy to violate, said act. Under these circumstances, the Constitution gave
the petitioner the privilege of remaining silent. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S.·
159, 71 S.Ct. 223 (1950).
It is settled that in a proceeding before a grand jury, a witness may refuse
to answer any question or to disclose any circumstance from which evidence
leading to the witness' conviction of a federal crime might be obtained.5 This
constitutional privilege extends not only to answers which directly admit any
element of the crime, but also to those which logically, though mediately, tend
to establish any of the elements of the crime.6 The holding of the principal
case indicates that the Supreme Court now considers mere membership, knowledge, or association with the Communist Party sufficient to furnish a link in the
chain of evidence whereby a conviction under the Smith Act might be reasonably obtained. Whether the Communist Party actually advocates the violent
overthrow of the government has long been the subject of investigation by the
courts. The cases first arose after World War I, particularly in proceedings for
the denaturalization or deportation of persons affiliated with the Communist
Party. The holdings of these cases seems generally to have been that (I) the
purposes of the Communist Party were not matters of judicial notice, but rather
of evidence and proof,7 and (2) such purposes of the Communist Party, even
1 "No person • . • shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.•••" U.S. Const., Amend. V.
•
2 Blau v. United States, (10th Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 103.
s 339 U.S. 956, 70 S.Ct. 979 (1950).
4 62 Stat. L. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §2385.
5 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 S.Ct. 195 (1892).
6 United States v. St. Pierre, (2d Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 837; United States v. Weisman, (2d Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 260.
7 lli: Parte Fierstein, (9th Cir. 1930) 41 F. (2d) 53. But see Murdoch v. Clark, (1st
Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 155 at 157, where the court after holding that the evidence sustained the proof made the following statement: "The Program of the Red International
Labor Union and the Communists is now a matter of general knowledge."
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when proved, must be shown to have been subscribed to by the individual member to sustain the suit.8 In the famous Schneiderman case,9 these conclusions
were upheld by the Supreme Court. But the strong dissent of Justice Stone and
the vigorous criticisms of the decision by various writers portended that the
issue of the criminality of the Communist Party was far from settled.10 With
the termination of World War II, the question has re-emerged with increasing
frequency. One line of decisions, adhering to the Schneiderman view, persists
in its refusal to notice judicially that the purposes of the Communist Party
call for the illegal overthrow of the government by force. 11 However, a growing
tendency of the courts,1 2 and that apparently now adopted by the executive13
and legislative14 branches of the government, seems to be contrary. The holding
of the principal case lends emphasis to this view. It is true that the present
decisions recognize that membership alone in a society which advocates the
forceful overthrow of the government, without an actual personal knowledge
of such purposes, will not sustain a conviction under the Smith Act.15 But the
growing recognition by the courts that the illegal purposes of the Communist
Party are matters of common knowledge would certainly make it difficult for
a person charged with membership in the party to refute personal knowledge
of its beliefs. An admission of actual membership or association with the Communist Party, then, does furnish direct means whereby conviction under the
Smith Act might he obtained. As such, the principal case is in accord with the
accepted view that the privilege against self-incrimination may be asserted.16

Morris G. Shanker
s United States v. Tapolcsanyi, (3d Cir. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 255 at 257.
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943).
1o See 32 GEo. L.J. 405 (1944); 23 Nonm DAME LA.W1c."ER 577 (1948). Despite
these criticisms, it is interesting to note that no member of the Communist Party had ever
been prosecuted under the Smith Act until the very recent case of United States v. Dennis,
(2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 201, cert. granted 339 U.S. 162, 71 S.Ct. 91 (1950), which
was pending before the district court at the time of the principal case.
11 Stasiukevich v. Nicolls, (1st Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 474, note 5.
1 2 1n re MacKay, (D.C. Ind. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 397; United States v. Dennis, supra
note 10, at p. 212.
13 See testimony of the spokesman for the Department of Justice in Hearings before
the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 81st Cong., 2d sess., at 85
(1950).
14 See Necessity for Legislation, Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. L. 987.
15 Dunne v. United States, (8th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 137 at 144; United States
v. Foster, (D.C. N.Y. 1949) 9 F.R.D. 367 at 392. That membership alone in the Communist Party is not per se a violation of any criminal statute has been expressly provided for
in the Internal Security Act, supra note 14, section 4(f).
16 Since the decision in the principal case, the Supreme Court decided that once membership in the Communist Party has been freely admitted, then the privilege of self-incrimination is waived as to further answers which merely disclose additional details about that
membership and which could not possibly incriminate the petitioner further. The Court
also noted the newly enacted provisions of the Internal Security Act, supra note 15, but
"express[ed] no opinion as to the implications of this legislation upon the issues presented
by these cases." The diss~t felt that the holdings were in conflict with the principal case.
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 at 372, note 12, 71 S.Ct. 438 (1951).
9

